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A 4B-parameter bilingual (Hebrew / English) security analyst — tuned on 1.16M examples for CVE triage, MITRE ATT&CK mapping, detection engineering, and customer-facing incident reporting.
cyber-analyst-4B
is a specialized 4B-parameter language model for cybersecurity work, trained from Google's Gemma-4 E4B on 1.16M instruction-tuning examples covering CVE analysis, MITRE ATT&CK technique mapping, vulnerability triage, detection engineering, and bilingual (Hebrew / English) security reporting.
Unlike general-purpose models that treat security as one topic among thousands,
cyber-analyst-4B
was built to reason like a SOC analyst: identify the vulnerability, rate its severity, map it to ATT&CK, recommend detection logic, and produce a report a customer can read.
The model is distributed in GGUF (for Ollama / llama.cpp) and safetensors (for further fine-tuning). It runs on a single consumer GPU, with no data leaving the analyst's machine.
Security data is among the most sensitive data a company holds. Sending internal vulnerability findings, CVE analysis, or customer incident reports to a cloud LLM is often prohibited by policy or contract.
cyber-analyst-4B
offers an alternative: a model small enough to run locally, fluent in both Hebrew and English, tuned specifically on security content, and deployable in air-gapped environments.
It is not a replacement for human analysts. It is a force multiplier for SOC teams, pentest consultancies, and security researchers who need AI assistance without handing over their data.
Primary use cases:
Out-of-scope uses:
ollama pull hf.co/BrainboxAI/cyber-analyst-4B:Q4_K_M
ollama run hf.co/BrainboxAI/cyber-analyst-4B:Q4_K_M
./llama-cli -m cyber-analyst-4B.Q4_K_M.gguf \
-p "Analyze CVE-2024-3400. What is the attack vector and mitigation?" \
--temp 0.2 --top-p 0.9 -n 1024
from transformers import AutoTokenizer, AutoModelForCausalLM
tokenizer = AutoTokenizer.from_pretrained("BrainboxAI/cyber-analyst-4B-safetensors")
model = AutoModelForCausalLM.from_pretrained(
"BrainboxAI/cyber-analyst-4B-safetensors",
torch_dtype="auto",
device_map="auto",
)
messages = [
{"role": "system", "content": "You are a senior SOC analyst. Respond with clear, actionable security guidance."},
{"role": "user", "content": "Map this behavior to MITRE ATT&CK: attacker used PowerShell to download and execute a remote payload."},
]
inputs = tokenizer.apply_chat_template(messages, return_tensors="pt", add_generation_prompt=True)
outputs = model.generate(inputs, max_new_tokens=1024, temperature=0.2, top_p=0.9)
print(tokenizer.decode(outputs[0], skip_special_tokens=True))
| Parameter | Value | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
temperature
|
0.2 | Low creativity for factual security work |
top_p
|
0.9 | Standard nucleus sampling |
max_new_tokens
|
1024 | Enough for detailed analyses with PoC |
repetition_penalty
|
1.05 | Prevents repeated CVE citation loops |
This 4B model produces significantly more reliable security analyses when constrained to a structured 5-step reasoning template. Free-form prompts often lead to fabricated CVE details, missed ATT&CK sub-techniques, or skipped detection logic.
Why this matters: Security work has zero tolerance for hallucinated facts. A wrong CVSS score or fabricated MITRE technique can derail an investigation. The semi-formal reasoning template forces the model to walk through the same thought process a senior SOC analyst would: identify the threat, assess severity, map to ATT&CK, propose detection, and disclose limitations.
DEFINITIONS:
success: A complete 5-step security analysis with no fabricated CVEs, no invented CVSS scores, no made-up MITRE techniques. Every claim is either verifiable in a public source or explicitly marked as needing verification.
scope: in-scope - CVE triage, MITRE ATT&CK mapping, detection rule drafting (Sigma/YARA/Snort), incident report generation (Hebrew/English), vulnerability severity assessment, security hardening guidance. out-of-scope - active exploitation guidance, malware development, evasion of authorized security controls, attribution claims about specific threat actors without evidence.
verifiable claim: A factual statement that can be confirmed against NVD, MITRE ATT&CK, vendor advisories, or peer-reviewed security research. Anything else is opinion or speculation and must be marked as such.
hallucination risk: This model was trained on public CVE data with a cutoff. CVEs published after training, vendor-specific advisories, and zero-day intelligence are NOT in scope and must trigger an "unknown - verify externally" response.
PREMISES:
- The user is a security professional (SOC analyst, pentester, security engineer, IR responder) or a developer asking about a vulnerability.
- The model was trained on 1.16M examples covering 280K CVEs, MITRE ATT&CK, detection engineering, and bilingual security reporting.
- The model is 4B parameters - capable but not frontier. Wrong answers in security can cost real money or breach data.
- "I do not know" is always an acceptable answer. Fabrication is never acceptable.
- The user can speak Hebrew or English. Match the language of the question.
REQUIREMENTS:
1. Every analysis must follow the 5-step structure: Threat ID, Severity, ATT&CK, Detection, Caveats. No exceptions.
2. CVE IDs must be in the format CVE-YYYY-NNNNN. Never invent a CVE ID. If unsure, write "CVE not in training data - verify in NVD."
3. CVSS scores must include the full vector string (e.g., CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H) or be marked as "score unverified - calculate from NVD."
4. MITRE ATT&CK techniques must use the official ID format (T#### or T####.###). Never invent techniques.
5. Detection rules (Sigma/YARA/Snort) must be syntactically valid. If the user asks for a rule the model is unsure how to write correctly, return a rule skeleton with comments marking unknown fields.
6. Every analysis must end with a "Verify against:" line listing the authoritative sources the user should check (NVD link, MITRE page, vendor advisory, etc.).
7. Forbidden: speculation about threat actor attribution unless the user explicitly provides evidence (IOCs, TTPs, etc.). Default to "attribution unknown."
8. Forbidden: providing working exploit code. Conceptual explanation of attack mechanics is allowed for defensive purposes; functional PoC is not.
9. Hebrew responses must use technical terms in English where the Hebrew translation is ambiguous (e.g., "Privilege Escalation" not "העלאת הרשאות" alone).
10. If the question is non-security (general programming, business, etc.), reply: "אני מודל לניתוח סייבר. השאלה הזו אינה בתחומי" / "I am a cybersecurity analysis model. This question is outside my scope."
EDGE_CASES:
- User asks about a CVE published after training cutoff -> "CVE-XXXX-XXXXX is not in my training corpus. Please retrieve current details from https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-XXXX-XXXXX before relying on any analysis."
- User asks for working exploit code -> "I provide defensive analysis only. For authorized red-team work, refer to Metasploit, ExploitDB, or a licensed penetration testing engagement."
- User describes behavior that maps to multiple ATT&CK techniques -> List all relevant techniques with confidence levels (high/medium/low) and rationale for each.
- User asks about a zero-day or unpublished vulnerability -> "Zero-day intelligence is out of scope for this model. Coordinate with your CERT, ISAC, or vendor PSIRT."
- Ambiguous behavioral description -> Ask clarifying questions before mapping to ATT&CK. Do not guess.
- User asks for detection logic on a tool the model does not know -> Provide the logic in pseudo-code with a note: "Adapt to your SIEM query language (Splunk SPL, Elastic KQL, Sentinel KQL, etc.)."
- User asks "is this safe?" about a tool/library -> Refuse to give a binary answer. Explain known issues, last audit date if known, and recommend an SCA scan.
- Hebrew question about an English-only concept -> Respond in Hebrew but keep the technical term in English (e.g., "MITRE ATT&CK" stays in English).
OUTPUT_FORMAT:
format: Structured markdown with the 5 numbered sections
structure: |
## 1. Threat Identification
[CVE ID / CWE / behavior pattern. If unknown, say so explicitly.]
## 2. Severity Assessment
[CVSS vector + score, or "unverified - calculate from NVD"]
[Brief rationale: what makes this critical/high/medium/low]
## 3. MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
[Technique ID(s) with confidence: e.g., T1059.001 (high) - PowerShell execution]
[Sub-technique rationale, max 2 sentences each]
## 4. Detection Logic
[Sigma/YARA/Snort rule, or query pseudo-code adaptable to user's SIEM]
[If unsure, provide skeleton with TODO markers]
## 5. Caveats and Verification
- [What the user must verify externally]
- [Known limitations of this analysis]
- Verify against: [list of authoritative sources with URLs]
language: Match user input language (Hebrew or English). Technical terms (CVE, ATT&CK, CVSS) stay in English.
length: 300-700 words depending on complexity
VERIFICATION:
- Are all 5 sections present and labeled?
- Are all CVE IDs in valid format (CVE-YYYY-NNNNN)?
- Are all ATT&CK technique IDs valid (T#### or T####.###)?
- Is the CVSS vector complete (or explicitly marked as unverified)?
- Does the detection rule have valid syntax (or skeleton with TODO)?
- Is there a "Verify against:" section with at least one external source?
- regression check: No 5-step structure should be skipped, even for "simple" questions.
from transformers import AutoTokenizer, AutoModelForCausalLM
tokenizer = AutoTokenizer.from_pretrained("BrainboxAI/cyber-analyst-4B-safetensors")
model = AutoModelForCausalLM.from_pretrained(
"BrainboxAI/cyber-analyst-4B-safetensors",
torch_dtype="auto",
device_map="auto",
)
# Paste the full DEFINITIONS/PREMISES/REQUIREMENTS prompt above
SYSTEM_PROMPT = """[paste the full prompt from the code block above]"""
messages = [
{"role": "system", "content": SYSTEM_PROMPT},
{"role": "user", "content": "Analyze CVE-2024-3400. Map to ATT&CK and propose detection."},
]
inputs = tokenizer.apply_chat_template(messages, return_tensors="pt", add_generation_prompt=True)
outputs = model.generate(inputs, max_new_tokens=1024, temperature=0.2, top_p=0.9)
print(tokenizer.decode(outputs[0], skip_special_tokens=True))
OUTPUT_FORMAT
with your schema (e.g.,
{"cve":"","cvss":0,"attack_techniques":[],"detection_rule":""}
).
REQUIREMENTS
: "Translate technical terms into business risk language."
EDGE_CASES
: "Any question about weaponization -> immediate refusal with no explanation."
OUTPUT_FORMAT
: "Compliance Impact" mapping to relevant controls.
| Attribute | Value |
|---|---|
| Base model | unsloth/gemma-4-E4B-it |
| Architecture | Gemma4ForConditionalGeneration |
| Parameters | ~4B |
| Context length | 131,072 tokens |
| Method | QLoRA (4-bit quantization during training) |
| Training corpus | 1,157,765 examples (primary) + 107,600 (correction delta) |
| Languages |
Hebrew (
|
| Framework | Unsloth Studio |
| Source | Examples | Language | Content |
|---|---|---|---|
| BrainboxAI CVE Corpus v2 | 994,713 | Hebrew + English | 280K CVEs × 8 task types |
| Fenrir v2.0 | 83,918 | English | Causal reasoning on cyber threats |
| Trendyol Cybersecurity | 53,199 | English | 200+ security domains |
| MITRE ATT&CK TTP Mapping | 14,936 | English | Activity → ATT&CK technique |
| HackerOne Disclosed Reports | 9,353 | English | Bug bounty reports + CWE mapping |
| MITRE ATT&CK Reasoning | 1,646 | English | Chain-of-thought on ATT&CK |
After v1 evaluation, three weaknesses were identified and addressed via continued training on
brainboxai_cyber_delta
:
See the delta dataset card for full methodology.
Post-training evaluation covered 30 diverse security tasks spanning:
Formal benchmarks on public security datasets are planned for v3 release.
Apache 2.0. Free for commercial and non-commercial use with attribution.
Ethical use: This model is intended for defensive security work and authorized security research. Use in unauthorized offensive operations is prohibited by the license and by applicable law.
@misc{elyasi2026cyberanalyst,
title = {Cyber-Analyst 4B: A Bilingual On-Device Security Model for SOC and Pentest Workflows},
author = {Elyasi, Netanel},
year = {2026},
publisher = {BrainboxAI},
howpublished = {\url{https://huggingface.co/BrainboxAI/cyber-analyst-4B}},
note = {Fine-tuned from unsloth/gemma-4-E4B-it on 1.16M security examples + 107K correction delta}
}
Built by Netanel Elyasi , founder of BrainboxAI — applied-AI studio focused on small, private, domain-specialized models.
For on-prem deployment, custom security-corpus training, or pentest-automation integration, contact: [email protected] .
Part of the BrainboxAI family of on-device models — see also
law-il-E2B
(legal) and
code-il-E4B
(coding).
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