Breaking Intel AMT: Unveiling Security Risks and Exploitation

Table of Contents:

1. Introduction
2. Intel System Architecture
3. Intel Management Engine (ME)
4. Intel Active Management Technology (AMT)
5. Unauthorized Remote Access to Intel AMT
6. Expanding the Coverage of the Vulnerability
7. Mitigating the Intel AMT Vulnerability
8. Potential Risks and Exploitation of Intel AMT
9. Swapping from 1.5MB to 5MB Firmware Image
10. Conclusion

Introduction

Exploring the Security of Embedded Smart Devices

In this article, we will delve into the world of embedded smart devices and focus on the security vulnerabilities Present in Intel Management Engine (ME) and Intel Active Management Technology (AMT). These technologies, although powerful and widely used, pose risks in terms of unauthorized remote access and potential exploitation by malicious actors. We will explore in-depth the system architecture, the vulnerabilities present, as well as mitigating techniques to protect against these risks.

Intel System Architecture

Understanding the Intel 64 System Architecture

Before delving into the specifics of Intel ME and AMT, it is important to understand the overall system architecture. The Intel CPU is the main execution environment, but there are also integrated subsystems and controllers to support peripheral devices and system critical functions. One of these subsystems is Intel Management Engine, which serves as an isolated and powerful execution environment stored on SPI flash memory. It is divided into several regions, with each region serving a specific purpose. Understanding this architecture is crucial to comprehend the vulnerabilities and risks associated with Intel ME and AMT.

Intel Management Engine (ME)

Unveiling the Hidden Execution Environment

Intel Management Engine (ME) is a powerful execution environment within the Intel system, boasting a Hidden and stealthy nature. Stored on SPI flash memory alongside the BIOS, ME is designed for Intel AMT storage and holds internally stored binary code. It is accessible even when the computer is turned off but plugged into an outlet, making it a significant security concern. The ME architecture is based on an MCU with raw memory and serves as a privileged execution environment in the system. However, gaining access to ME can be challenging due to its proprietary code and strict security measures. We will explore the architecture in detail while discussing reverse engineering and the possibilities it presents.

Intel Active Management Technology (AMT)

Understanding Remote Control and Administration

Intel Active Management Technology (AMT) serves as a code model implemented in Intel ME, focusing on remote control and administration of computer systems. AMT provides various features such as remote powering on and system resetting, accessing BIOS setup through serial Overland, retrieving system hardware information via a web interface, booting from a custom boot image file, and gaining full control of the monitor, keyboard, and mouse through the remote desktop feature. However, these features require the system to have AMT present and properly configured. We will discuss the various ways to access AMT features and explore the potential risks associated with them.

Unauthorized Remote Access to Intel AMT

Unveiling the Vulnerability

One of the significant challenges with Intel AMT is unauthorized remote access. An attacker can exploit vulnerabilities in the Intel AMT web server to gain unauthorized access and control over the system. Through the use of tools like a proxy server, the attacker can intercept network traffic and manipulate the authentication process. By understanding the inner workings of Intel AMT, including the authorization header fields and the authentication process, the attacker can bypass the security measures and gain administrative access to the system. We will analyze the exploit in detail and discuss potential mitigation techniques.

Expanding the Coverage of the Vulnerability

Assessing the Impact on Non-vPro Systems

While the vulnerability in Intel AMT and ME is well-documented for vPro systems, we need to understand the potential impact on non-vPro systems. Through our research, we have discovered that Intel AMT code exists on both vPro and non-vPro systems, with the main difference lying in the presence of the Intel AMT MEI model in the UEFI BIOS. This model utilizes the Host Embedded Controller Interface (HECI) to configure Intel AMT. We are currently investigating ways in which an attacker can activate Intel AMT on non-vPro systems, potentially expanding the scope of the vulnerability. Our research is ongoing, and we will share the results as they become available.

Mitigating the Intel AMT Vulnerability

Protecting Your Systems

As the vulnerabilities in Intel AMT pose significant risks, it is essential to implement mitigation techniques to protect your systems. While the community has developed several methods to mitigate the vulnerabilities, none are foolproof. Blocking the AMT network port in the network firewall is not always a feasible solution for companies that rely on AMT for remote management. Disabling AMT functionality through firmware updates is also an option, but it requires user intervention and may not be available for all systems. We will explore the various mitigation techniques and discuss the potential challenges and considerations associated with each approach.

Potential Risks and Exploitation of Intel AMT

Identifying the Risks

Intel AMT's capabilities can be appealing not only to authorized system administrators but also to potential attackers. The ability to gain remote access and control over a system can have severe consequences if exploited maliciously. It is essential to understand the potential risks involved in the widespread usage of Intel AMT and the steps that attackers can take to exploit its functionalities. We will discuss the escalation of privileges and the potential implications for enterprise organizations, public institutions, and critical infrastructure.

Swapping from 1.5MB to 5MB Firmware Image

Expanding Intel AMT Capabilities

Exploiting hardware vulnerabilities, it is possible to swap the firmware image from 1.5MB to 5MB on certain systems. This process involves unlocking the SPI flash regions and using an SPI flash programmer or modifying the firmware from the software level. By performing this swap, the system gains the full functionalities of Intel AMT, expanding its capabilities beyond the original hardware specifications. Although this process requires administrator privileges and can be risky, it highlights the potential risks associated with Intel AMT and the need for robust security measures.

Conclusion

Navigating the Complexities of Intel AMT

In conclusion, the world of Intel Management Engine and Active Management Technology is fascinating yet fraught with security risks. Understanding the system architecture, vulnerabilities, and potential exploitation techniques is essential for system administrators, security professionals, and users alike. While some mitigation techniques exist, there is no perfect solution, and ongoing research is necessary to stay ahead of potential threats. By raising awareness about these vulnerabilities and discussing mitigation strategies, we hope to foster a more secure environment for embedded smart devices.